Building With BRICS: Energy and Resource Opportunities for Canada with the BRICS+ Bloc

Building With BRICS: Energy and Resource Opportunities for Canada with the BRICS+ Bloc

Soham Kulkarni


The U.S. tariff regime, the unreliability of CUSMA as a guarantor of market access, and the rapid consolidation of a BRICS+ bloc that now includes 11 full members and 10 partner countries together representing roughly 44% of global GDP at PPP and 56% of the world’s population make resource-led diversification toward BRICS economies a national-economic necessity, not an ideological choice. [1][2]

This brief sets out a six-pillar strategy for orienting Canada’s energy and resource sectors toward BRICS+ markets and capital. It aligns deliberately with the Carney government’s stated objective of doubling non-U.S. exports within a decade and increasing exports to China by 50% by 2030 [3], while pushing past the cautious, U.S.-aligned framing that still dominates Ottawa’s outlook.

The six pillars are:

  • Pillar 1 — LNG, LPG and crude oil to India, leveraging the Carney–Modi bilateral track.
  • Pillar 2 — Critical minerals export and co-processing partnerships with China, on terms that retain Canadian value-add.
  • Pillar 3 — Inbound Chinese clean-tech and EV/battery investment under the January 2026 Canada–China tariff-quota agreement.
  • Pillar 4 — UAE and Gulf-BRICS sovereign capital for nation-building energy and minerals infrastructure.
  • Pillar 5 — Brazil mining and energy cooperation, building on the existing CCBC channel and the 2025 Sidhu mission.
  • Pillar 6 — Uranium, nuclear fuel-cycle and green-tech cooperation across BRICS economies decarbonising their power systems.

1. Context

1.1 The BRICS+ bloc in 2026

BRICS has expanded twice since 2023. As of 2026, full members are Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Indonesia, with Saudi Arabia’s accession finalised in mid-2025. The partner-country tier which was created at the 2024 Kazan summit adds Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam, with a further pipeline of more than 30 countries that have expressed interest. [1][2]

Critically for Canada’s resource strategy, this bloc concentrates both commodity demand (China, India, Indonesia) and commodity supply (Brazil, Russia, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran). With Iran, the UAE and Saudi Arabia inside the tent, BRICS+ now controls close to half of global oil production and roughly 35% of consumption [4], making it the principal arena in which the next two decades of energy trade will be priced and routed.

1.2 Canada’s Diversification Imperative

The Carney government has explicitly framed trade diversification as a response to U.S. economic coercion. The January 2026 Canada–China economic and trade roadmap commits both sides to “healthy, stable and sustainable” relations and welcomes Chinese investment in energy, agriculture and consumer products [3][5]. The November 2025 Canada–UAE Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA) was signed alongside a UAE pledge of up to C$70 billion in Canadian energy, AI, logistics and mining projects [6][7]. The Carney–Modi bilateral track aims to double Canada–India trade to roughly $50 billion by 2030 [8].

1.3 The proximity-to-USA challenge

As the March 17 meeting noted, Canada’s geographic and infrastructural integration with the U.S. is the principal obstacle to a serious multipolar pivot. Roughly 63% of Canadian critical-mineral exports still go to the U.S., as does the overwhelming majority of crude oil [9]. Tidewater pipeline and LNG capacity to non-U.S. markets remains constrained: the Trans Mountain Expansion is the only meaningful westbound oil corridor, and LNG Canada Phase 1 (~14 Mtpa) is the only operating West Coast LNG terminal as of early 2026, with Cedar LNG, Woodfibre LNG and Ksi Lisims still under construction or in approvals [10][11].

Resource diversification requires both a market strategy (the six pillars below) and an infrastructure strategy: pipelines, port expansions, processing facilities and rail. This is the basis for the meeting’s “Crown corporations for development projects” line — without sovereign Canadian infrastructure capacity, BRICS market access remains theoretical.

2. Pillar 1 — LNG, LPG and Crude Oil to India

2.1 The opportunity

India is the most strategically important BRICS market for Canadian hydrocarbons. India’s stated objective is to lift natural gas from 6% to 15% of its primary-energy mix [8]. Energy Minister Tim Hodgson, who visited New Delhi in late January 2026 ahead of Prime Minister Carney’s March 2026 trade mission, called India “one of the most important energy markets in the world” and noted that Canada currently sells less than 1% of its production to India [8][12].

Three product streams are on the table:

  • LNG: Canadian export capacity is targeted at ~50 Mtpa by 2030 across LNG Canada (existing 14 Mtpa), Cedar LNG, Woodfibre LNG and the proposed Ksi Lisims and LNG Canada Phase 2; Hodgson has publicly floated 100 Mtpa as the longer-term ceiling. [10][11]
  • LPG/Propane: millions of Indian households use LPG for cooking and heating; Hodgson has explicitly named this as a near-term Canadian export opportunity. [8]
  • Crude oil: Indian imports of Canadian-origin crude rose 52% year-on-year in 2025 to 84,000 b/d, predominantly Cold Lake and Western Canadian Select grades, as India seeks alternatives to sanctioned Russian crude. [12]

This pillar is the single most defensible piece of the BRICS messaging in Canadian political and business audiences, because it is already government policy and already supported by the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) and provincial premiers in BC, Alberta and Saskatchewan [11][13]. The working group should lean on this pillar in any opening pitch to economic-advocacy organisations: it requires no ideological persuasion, only a willingness to name India explicitly as a BRICS member and to argue that the same logic extends to other BRICS markets.

There is a credible climate counter-narrative, most notably from the International Institute for Sustainable Development and Environmental Defence Canada, who argue Asia-Pacific buyers are shifting to short-term contracts and that long-term LNG demand may decline [14]. Our messaging should pre-empt this by emphasising the Public Policy Forum / Canadian Chamber finding that Canadian LNG displacing Asian coal delivers a 50% emissions reduction per unit of electricity, and 40% versus U.S. LNG, which gives Canadian product a defensible “transition fuel” framing in centrist and Liberal-aligned audiences. [13]

3. Pillar 2 — Critical Minerals: China and BRICS Midstream Partnerships

3.1 Opportunity and context

China refines roughly 70% of global supply across 19 of 20 critical minerals tracked by the IEA, including 60–90% of lithium, cobalt, rare earths and graphite refining capacity [17][18]. The U.S.-led FORGE alliance and the G7 Critical Minerals Production Alliance (which Canada chaired in 2025) have committed roughly $18.5 billion to Canadian projects [19][20] — but as RBC and the Asia Pacific Foundation have both noted, the Western alliance “does not need to displace China; it needs to constrain China’s ability to manipulate markets” [17][16]. That framing is the opening for a Canadian strategy that engages both sides.

In 2024, China was Canada’s second-largest critical-minerals trading partner, with $5.0 billion in two-way trade. Canada exported $3.0 billion to China. Copper ($2.0 billion) and potash ($500 million) and imported $2.0 billion, mostly aluminium and magnesium. Canada’s exports remain concentrated in Stage 1 and 2 of the value chain (mine-and-ship), while Chinese imports are predominantly Stage 3 finished products [9]. The strategic prize is moving Canadian exports up the value chain while opening Stage 3 imports we cannot domestically produce.

The Carney–Xi tariff-quota deal of 16 January 2026 substantially reset the bilateral trade relationship. China cut canola-seed tariffs from 84% to 14.9%, removed anti-discrimination tariffs on canola meal, peas, lobster and crab, in exchange for a Canadian quota of 49,000 Chinese EVs per year at 6.1% (rising to ~70,000 within five years) [3][5][21]. The accompanying Canada–China Economic and Trade Cooperation Roadmap commits both sides to “two-way investments and trade in clean and conventional energy” [5].

Practically, this means Canadian critical-minerals firms can now credibly pursue joint ventures with Chinese battery and EV manufacturers the legal route was reopened in January 2026, even though the Investment Canada Act’s State-Owned Enterprise policy still applies. MLT Aikins and Blakes have both published guidance noting the door is now open for Chinese investment in Canadian energy, agriculture and consumer products, with national-security concerns increasingly addressed via undertakings rather than outright rejection [22][23].

4. Pillar 3 – Chinese Clean-Tech and EV/Battery Investment in Canada

Chinese EV and battery manufacturers have announced approximately US$80 billion in overseas manufacturing investment over the past five years, in markets including Indonesia, Thailand, Brazil, Mexico and Türkiye [25]. Canada was excluded from this wave by the 2024 100% EV tariff — but the January 2026 quota deal explicitly contemplates “considerable Chinese investment into Canada’s auto sector” (Carney’s own words) [21], and the Canada–China roadmap names clean-energy storage and production as a priority cooperation area [5].

This is the meeting’s “Chinese technology in green tech” workstream. The pitch writes itself: Chinese household savings rate stands at roughly 40%, the highest in the OECD, and Chinese development banks and battery-sector firms are actively seeking outbound investment [25]. Canadian provinces with stranded auto-manufacturing capacity — particularly Ontario — are natural recipients.

Ontario Premier Doug Ford has publicly opposed the EV tariff cut, arguing it undercuts the North American auto strategy and the Stellantis-style investments that Canada has been pursuing [21][26]. The American auto sector’s failure to follow through on Canadian commitments (Stellantis being the canonical example) is the political opening here. The argument the working group should make: “Stellantis abandoned us; Chinese partners are willing to invest at the scale Canadian auto workers need.”

This argument lands hardest with NDP staffers (industrial-policy framing, jobs first) and with Liberal staffers anxious about Ontario seat losses. There will be significant pushback but we can be ready with numbers.

5. Pillar 4 — UAE and Gulf-BRICS Sovereign Capital for Resource Infrastructure

5.1 The deal already on the table

The November 2025 Canada–UAE FIPA, signed during Prime Minister Carney’s first visit to Abu Dhabi in over 40 years, was accompanied by a UAE commitment of up to C$70 billion to invest in Canadian energy, AI, logistics, mining and other strategic industries [6][7]. The UAE’s sovereign wealth funds — Mubadala, ADIA and ADQ — collectively hold over US$2 trillion in assets under management. The new ADNOC investment vehicle, XRG, is already mandated to participate in Canadian LNG and critical-minerals projects [27].

A parallel FIPA negotiation with Qatar is targeted for completion by summer 2026, with a Qatari commitment to invest in Canadian “nation-building projects” [22]. Saudi Arabia is in the early stages of similar talks.

5.2 Why this matters strategically

Canada’s critical-minerals sector faces an estimated US$500–600 billion global capital requirement by 2040 [18], and the IEA forecasts critical-minerals demand growth of 2–3x by 2040. Canadian pension funds — unlike Australian ones — do not maintain a standing allocation to resources [18]. Without Gulf-BRICS capital (or Chinese capital, see Pillar 2), the projects in our critical-minerals and LNG pipeline simply will not be financed at the speed required.

The strongest counter-argument here comes from the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, who note that 73% of equity in Canada’s “Big Four” oil and gas producers is already foreign-held, predominantly American, and that UAE capital risks turning Canada into a “high-end middleman” funnelling Emirati petrodollars into U.S.-owned assets [27]. There are also serious concerns regarding the UAE’s role in the Sudan conflict, its treatment of migrant workers under the kafala system, and AML/FATF risks [27]. The working group’s messaging needs to acknowledge these concerns directly rather than dismiss them — credibility on the left depends on it.

6. Pillar 5 – Brazil Mining and Energy Cooperation

6.1 The existing channel

Canadian mining firms — Kinross (gold), Sigma Lithium (Jequitinhonha Valley), Lundin Mining (copper), and Largo (vanadium) — already operate at scale in Brazil [28]. The Brazilian Mining Institute (IBRAM) projects up to US$68.4 billion in mining investment 2025–2029, with strong demand for Canadian expertise in critical-minerals processing [28]. Canada–Brazil mineral trade was Canada’s third-largest in 2024 at $3.7 billion [9].

In August 2025, International Trade Minister Maninder Sidhu visited Brazil and Colombia, meeting with Brazil’s Vice-President Geraldo Alckmin and Mines and Energy Minister Alexandre Silveira to discuss critical minerals, clean energy and supply chains [29]. Canada has also reopened the path toward a Mercosur free-trade agreement [28].

Brazil holds the third-largest rare-earth reserves globally (~21 million tonnes), plus large lithium, cobalt, nickel and copper deposits [30]. Brazil and the UAE signed a strategic-minerals MoU in January 2025 worth up to US$2.45 billion [30]. There is a clear opening for trilateral Canada–Brazil–UAE cooperation on critical-minerals processing — a structure that lets Canada offer technical expertise and IP, Brazil contributes the resource, and Gulf-BRICS capital finances the midstream. This is exactly the kind of “south-south plus middle power” arrangement that makes BRICS engagement strategically coherent rather than ideologically fraught.

7. Pillar 6 – Uranium, Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Green-Tech Cooperation

Canada is the world’s second-largest uranium producer (Cameco’s Saskatchewan operations) and supplies the U.S. nuclear fleet via NRC-licensed contracts. As BRICS economies — China, India, Russia, and increasingly Egypt, the UAE and Indonesia — expand civilian nuclear capacity, there is a strategic Canadian export opportunity in uranium concentrate, conversion services, CANDU technology, and small-modular-reactor (SMR) cooperation [32].

This pillar is sensitive — non-proliferation concerns and Indo-Pacific safeguards complicate the India relationship in particular but should be developed as a long-horizon workstream rather than dropped. The Canada–India joint statement of January 2026 explicitly named cooperation in “renewable energy, including hydrogen, biofuels and sustainable aviation fuel; battery storage; critical minerals; clean technologies; electricity systems” as priorities [12], creating scope for clean-tech engagement even where nuclear is constrained.

8. References

[1] Brazil 2025 BRICS Presidency, “About the BRICS,” brics.br/en/about-the-brics, accessed April 2026.

[2] Geopolitical Economy Report, “BRICS expands to 56% of world population, 44% of global GDP: Vietnam joins as partner country,” 4 July 2025; “BRICS expands with new partner countries,” 7 January 2025.

[3] Government of Canada, “Canada secures renewed market access with China to boost exports and strengthen economic collaboration,” Global Affairs Canada news release, 4 March 2026.

[4] Stimson Center, “2025 BRICS Summit: Takeaways and Projections,” 27 August 2025.

[5] Government of Canada, Canada–China Economic and Trade Cooperation Roadmap, January 2026; “Backgrounder — Preliminary Joint Arrangement on Addressing Bilateral Economic and Trade Issues between Canada and the People’s Republic of China,” March 2026.

[6] Global Affairs Canada, “Canada–United Arab Emirates relations,” updated December 2025.

[7] Blakes, “Investment Canada Act Update: Canada Opens Door to Greater Investment From China and Expands Global Partnerships,” 26 January 2026.

[8] Energy Connects / Bloomberg, “Canada Aims for More LNG Exports to India as Carney Plans Visit,” 30 January 2026.

[9] Natural Resources Canada, Mineral Trade publication, data as of April 2025.

[10] Natural Resources Canada, “Canadian liquified natural gas projects,” updated 2025–2026; CBC News, “Canada poised to become ‘one of the largest suppliers of LNG in the world’: energy minister,” 3 March 2026.

[11] Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), “The Case for Canadian LNG,” October 2025; Resource Works, “Canada’s LNG exports to hit new levels,” 11 March 2026 (citing Norton Rose Fulbright).

[12] S&P Global, “IEW 2026: India looks to tap Canada to meet growing appetite for crude, LPG, LNG,” 27 January 2026.

[13] Canadian Chamber of Commerce / Public Policy Forum, “Refuel: What Canadian LNG and oil exports could mean for global emissions,” December 2025.

[14] The Energy Mix, “LNG Markets Fade, India Leapfrogs to Solar as Carney Prepares for Trade Mission,” 26 February 2026 (citing International Institute for Sustainable Development and Environmental Defence Canada).

[15] CBC News, “Premier Moe calls China-Canada preliminary deal on canola, peas tariffs a ‘very significant decision,’” 20 January 2026.

[16] Policy Magazine, “How Canada Can Meet the China Challenge in Critical Minerals,” Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada panel proceedings, September 2025.

[17] RBC Climate Action Institute, “Mine & Refine: Bridging Canada’s Critical Minerals Capital Gap,” 2025; RBC, “Trade Zone: Canada’s big critical minerals push,” 9 October 2025.

[18] Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, “‘Critical minerals’ strategy is going down a cynical road,” March 2026.

[19] Government of Canada, “Canada unlocks 26 new investments and partnerships with 9 allied countries to secure critical minerals supply chains,” Natural Resources Canada news release, 31 October 2025.

[20] Government of Canada, “Canada’s Critical Minerals Strategy: Progress update,” updated 27 February 2026.

[21] The Globe and Mail, “What to know about the Canada-China tariff deal on EVs and canola,” 24 January 2026; Al Jazeera, “Canada, China strike trade deals to slash tariffs on EVs, canola,” 16 January 2026; Global News, 17 January 2026.

[22] MLT Aikins, “A new era in Canada-China trade: Key tariff changes and industry impacts,” 20 January 2026.

[23] Blakes (op. cit., reference 7).

[24] Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, “Canada’s new UAE trade and investment deal is bad news,” 18 February 2026.

[25] International Energy Agency, World Energy Investment 2025, Executive Summary.

[26] CBC News, “Carney wraps U.A.E. visit with pledge of $70B to be invested in Canada,” 21 November 2025.

[27] CCPA (op. cit., reference 24); Global Affairs Canada (op. cit., reference 6).

[28] Câmara de Comércio Brasil-Canadá (CCBC), “Mining in Brazil attracts global giants and opens space for new business,” 2025.

[29] Government of Canada, “Minister Sidhu strengthens trade ties in visit to Brazil and Colombia,” Global Affairs Canada news release, 31 August 2025.

[30] AGBI, “Brazil and UAE sign minerals exploration deal,” 14 January 2025.

[31] BRICS Wikipedia entry, citing Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (March 2025) and Russian Foreign Ministry briefing (October 2024); accessed April 2026.

[32] Gowling WLG, “Critical minerals: Canada’s role in the future of energy,” April 2025.